Nobody likes to consider the prospect of a currency crisis, but we think this is getting more likely by the day. We have long thought that the hiking cycle in the US would cause at least one major asset class to come unstuck.  When we wrote the original note, we didn’t think it would be European currencies, but this is what the price action now suggests. Both sterling and euro have broken down out of previous trading ranges and both could test historic lows if the FX markets become prisoners of their own momentum, as sometimes happens. European investors need to own as many natural hedges as they can – US issuers in credit and dollar earners in equities.

We wanted to get a handle on which equity regions had the most risk-averse investors, so we measured the beta of our recommended overweight and underweight sectors. We found that reality is much messier than we thought and that pre-conceived, US-centric attitudes to risk do not translate well to other regions. Our numbers suggest that Eurozone investors are the most risk averse, but the sectors they use to express this view are not the ones that US investors would choose.

There is a widespread and unspoken assumption that the Fed will curtail QT if the US economy starts to suffer and that there are no circumstances in which it would accelerate it. We think this assumption needs to be tested. Our models suggest a bear-steepening in the US yield curve is more likely than continued inversion or a bull-steepening. If we are right, this can only be bad news for US and global equities, because our models suggest that the equity rally is completely explained by the recent collapse in 10-year yields. Indeed, equities have underperformed bonds on a risk-adjusted basis since the end of June. If the bond market becomes less supportive later this year, we think there is another significant down-leg in store for equities.

There is a leadership vacuum in global equity markets. The US, the Eurozone and the UK all have serious issues to confront, ranging from valuation excess and monetary tightening to political uncertainty and energy rationing. Japan and Emerging Asia share some of these problems but are not as badly affected. One is a low return, risk reduction trade, while the other offers high risk and high reward. Both strategies have a place in a well-diversified global equity portfolio.

The percentage of companies in the S&P500 with no drawdown in their earnings estimates is declining and just about to drop below its median for the last 15 years. The percentage where there is a drawdown of more than 20% is about to start rising, but from a low level. We are still within normal ranges on both measures, but if they move out of this, the downside is significant and the recovery takes much longer than the decline. At the sector level, we cannot make sense of the relative rankings in several cases. In particular, we think the consensus is far too optimistic about the outlook for Industrials.

We have cut our reasonable worst-case estimate of where the S&P500 may bottom from 3,400 to 3,000. This follows on from our last note which argued that current consensus earnings were likely to drop by at least 15% before hitting their trough sometime in 2023. Our new target implies a forward pe ratio of about 15x, which is slightly lower than the median for this century.  As consensus forecasts are reduced, we expect the earnings mix to move away from highly-valued sectors like Tech and Consumer Discretionary towards lowly-valued sectors like Energy and Materials. The other reason for our new target is that nobody has any profits from other investments which they can reinvest into equities. US 7-10 Treasuries are down by about 17% since the equity market peaked, compared with gains of about 10% at the equivalent stage of the bear markets in 2001 and 2008.

Bear markets can make the most rational of investment approaches look pretty stupid. Any concept of fair value based on consensus estimates can be downright dangerous. The typical delay between the peak in the index and the peak in estimates is more than 30 weeks, so we should not expect the consensus to start cutting until late August.  The typical drawdown in 12-month forward estimates lasts between 115 and 170 weeks. So, the estimates you are using for 2022/23 may also be the numbers for 2025/26.

The huge monetary interventions during the pandemic in the US and other countries were designed to protect equities from a surge in economic and financial risk. They succeeded, but at the cost of distorting the normal relationship between risk and return: specifically, the excess volatility vs the excess return of equities vs bonds. This is now reverting back to normal. As the volatility of equities rises relative to the volatility of bonds – and this figure is well below its long-run average, let alone its potential peak - their return relative to bonds must decline. The only developed market which may escape the worst of this adjustment is Switzerland.

Realised volatility continues to march higher every week and we have now got to the danger zone, where this creates the conditions for more volatility - especially if the FOMC is committed to much tighter monetary policy. In these circumstances, traditional valuation metrics lose a lot of their power and investors should assume that markets in one or more major asset classes will become disorderly. We think this has already begun in Nasdaq, Italian government bonds and the Chinese yuan. Other assets, which may follow in due course, include US High Yield, credit ETF’s and US housing.